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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
VERNON RENTZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20050707-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18a-l(l)(a) (2003) and UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 3(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal from the Probation 
Revocation and Commitment to Utah State Prison filed on July 19,2005, in this case involving a 
second degree felony and a third degree felony conviction from a court of record. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVDEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress pertaining to his 
probation revocation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The Court of Appeals reviews factual findings underlying 
the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard, 
and reviews the legal conclusions for correctness." Statev.Jarman. 1999 UT App 269, |4,987 P.2d 
1284. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AIVIEND. IV 
B. UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I §12 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 13, 2003, Vernon Rentz ("Rentz") was charged with Aggravated Robbery, a 
second degree felony, and two counts of Aggravated Assault, both third degree felonies. R0001-
R0002. On March 3,2003, Rentz entered his Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and 
Certificate of Counsel, pleading guilty to Aggravated Robbery and one count of Aggravated Assault. 
R0018-R0025. On April 16, 2005, a Judgment and Order of Probation was entered, sentencing 
Rentz to serve 1-15 years on the first charge and 0-5 years on the second charge. R0027-R0029. 
The sentences were both stayed and Rentz was ordered to serve 3 months in the San Juan County 
Jail and placed on probation for 36 months. Id On April 6,2003, Rentz was committed to the San 
Juan County Jail. R0030-R0032. On April 7,2003, Rentz entered into a probation agreement with 
Adult Probation and Parole. R0053. 
On October 20,2003, the State of Utah (the "State'5) filed an Order to Show Cause alleging 
that Rentz had violated his probation agreement in that he had failed to complete outpatient 
treatment, failed to seek or maintain full-time employment, failed to report, and used a controlled 
substance (marijuana). R0033-R0037. On November 26,2005, Honorable Judge Lyle Anderson 
of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan County, entered the court's Order 
Continuing Probation, revoking Rentz's probation and reinstating it for 36 months based on Rentz 
submitting himself to serve another 30 days in the San Juan County Jail. R0042-R0044. On 
December 17,2003, Rentz was committed to the San Juan County Jail. R0045-R0046. 
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On May 12, 2005, the State filed its Order to Show Cause (the "OSC") and affidavit in 
support alleging that Rente had violated the terms of his probation agreement in that he had owned, 
possessed or had under his control an explosive, firearm or dangerous weapon without written 
authorization. R0049-R0052. On May 13,2005, an arrest warrant was issued on the OSC, then later 
recalled on May 20,2005, since Rente had been booked into the jail. R0057-R0058. 
On July 12, 2005, Rente filed his Motion to Suppress (the "Motion") respecting the 
allegations contained in the OSC. R0068-R0069. On July 18,2005, the matter came for hearing on 
the Motion and the OSC. R0079. Judge Anderson concluded that the exclusionary rule did not 
apply to probation revocation hearings and entered the trial court's Probation Revocation and 
Commitment to Utah State Prison (the "Revocation"). R0070-R0071. On August 17,2005, Rente 
filed his Notice of Appeal from the Revocation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 23,2005, the local dispatch received a call from Dorothy Phillips ("Phillips") that 
Rente was harassing her and she was afraid because Rente was the owner of a gun, although he had 
not used or shown that he was in possession of any gun or weapon during the alleged harassment. 
Tr. at pp.10, 19, 20, 23. Officer Lambert Teschini ("Teschini") was dispatched and arrived 
regarding Phillips report. Teschini testified that, when he arrived on scene, Rente was an 
unauthorized occupant of a house approximately one hundred yards from Phillips' residence, and 
would not come out. Id. at pp. 10,12. Teschini borrowed a knife from Phillips to pry the door open 
where Rente was located. Id. at p. 26. Upon opening the door, Teschini found Rente to be sober, 
cooperative, and unarmed. Id. at p. 10. 
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Phillips told Teschini that Rente's girlfriend, who was staying at the woman's shelter in 
Blanding, Utah, had told Philips that there was a gun inside Rente's vehicle in the cup holder in the 
center console. Upon receiving information from Phillips that Rente had a gun in his vehicle, the 
police sergeant who arrived on scene asked Rente if they could search his vehicle, to which Rente 
consented. Tr. at p. 11,24. Rente was not under arrest at any point during the search. Id. at p. 24. 
Teschini thoroughly searched Rente's vehicle, including in the cup holder, under the hood, the tire, 
the tire well, etc., and did not locate a gun. Tr. at p. 11. Since the consensual search did not yield 
any results, the sergeant told Rente to leave the area. Id at pp. 12, 25-26. Teschini testified that 
Rente left, "...taking his time." Id at p. 12. 
Teschini then went to return the knife to Phillips and told her there was no gun in the cup 
holder. Tr. at p. 12. Phillips then told him that Rente's girlfriend had told her that Rente's cup 
holder could be removed and that there was a compartment underneath it. Id Officer Teschini did 
not personally speak with Rente's girlfriend respecting this information. Id. at p. 26. Teschini got 
in his patrol car, activated his light bar, followed in the direction Rente had gone. Id at p. 12. 
Rente had been gone from the residence only for a minute and had not committed any traffic 
violation. Tr. at p. 27. Teschini effectuated a stop of Rente's vehicle, told Rente that he needed to 
check one more area in the vehicle, and told Rente to step out of the vehicle and stand in front of it. 
Tr. at pp. 12, 27. Rente did not say anything, stepped out of the vehicle and stood in front of the 
vehicle, while Teschini conducted a further search. Tr.atpp. 12,15. Teschinijiggled the cup holder 
inside the vehicle and it popped open. Tr. p. 14. Teschini lifted out the cup holder and did not see 
a gun but, upon further investigation, he saw the magazine well of a gun and removed a gun from 
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that location. Tr. at p. 16. Teschini then turned the gun over to Mr. Lyman of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigations for safekeeping. Tr. at pp. 16,28. 
Teschini testified that he was not executing a probation search when he effectuated the stop 
and search of Rentz's vehicle. Id. at p. 17. Teschini additionally testified that he did not believe 
Rentz had violated any law by possessing the firearm. Id at p. 28. Since Teschini had never met 
Rentz and did not know he was on probation, Rentz was allowed to proceed on his way without the 
firearm and without arrest. Tr. at p. 11. 
On May 12,2005, after it was determined that Rentz was on probation during this incident, 
the State filed the OSC against Rentz, alleging that he had violated his probation agreement, in that 
he had owned, possessed, or had under his control a firearm. R0049-R0052. On July 8,2005, Rentz 
filed the Motion pursuant to UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I § 12 and UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 
AMEND. IV. R0068-0069. On July 18, 2005, the Motion and OSC came for hearing before 
Honorable Judge Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court. The trial court determined 
that suppression motions were inappropriate in probation revocation proceedings, denied the motion, 
and entered the Revocation. R0070-R0071. On August 17,2005, Rentz timely filed his Notice of 
Appeal from the Revocation. R0076-R0077. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The United States Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule is a creature of judicial decisional policy. Broadly stated, its purpose is to deter illegal police 
conduct by denying the state the benefit of improperly obtained evidence." Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 
LJEd.2d 1782 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). 
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State v. Dodd 419 So .2d 333 Fla.,1982.. The determination as to whether the Fourth Amendment 
should apply to probation and parole revocation proceedings has been analyzed by nearly every 
jurisdiction in the United States, but none of these jurisdictions has specifically touched on the issues 
contained herein. 
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott 524 U.S.357.118 S. Ct 2014,141 
L.Ed.2d 344, (U.S. Pa.1998), a bare majority decision, the United States Supreme Court undertook 
an analysis of the application of the exclusionary rule and the Fourth Amendment to parole 
revocation hearings. In Scott the court stated that a Fourth Amendment ". . .violation is 'fully 
accomplished' by the illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or 
administrative proceeding can 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already 
suffered."5 Id citing United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-3412, 82 
L.Ed.2d 677 (auotinz Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048-3049, 49 L.Ed.2d 
1067). In Scott, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to parole 
revocation proceedings and that the federal exclusionary rule does not bar evidence from being 
admitted that was obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Id 
The Utah Court of Appeals has applied the holdings in Scott to probation revocation 
proceedings in Utah. State v. Jarman. 1999 UT App 269, 987 P.2d 1284. The Utah Court of 
Appeals bridged the difference in the parole proceedings of Scott versus the probation proceedings 
in Jarman by stating that "...courts generally recognize the similarity between probation and parole 
proceedings and have treated them uniformly." Id at f 7. However, neither Jarman nor Scott 
discussed any exceptions to the application of the exclusionary rule to probation or parole revocation 
proceedings. 
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The Second District Court of Appeals has long held that "[p]arolees are, of course, not 
without constitutional rights...and there is always the possibility of police harassment...[which 
instances] can be treated as they arise." U. S. ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick. 426 F.2d 1161 (2nd 
Circuit, N.Y. 1970)(citations omitted). The Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
recognized that, if a case involves police harassment, an exclusion rule should be invoked to prevent 
recurrence. See, U.S. v. Farmer. 512 F.2d 160,162 (6th Cir. (Ky.) 1975); U.S. v. Brown, 488 F.2d 
94 (5th Cir. (Fla.) 1973). Our sister state, Colorado has similarly conceded that probationers are 
entitled to certain procedural due process rights at revocation hearings, People v. Atencio, 525 P.2d 
461 (Colo 1974), and its courts have cautioned that they would not condone "gross official 
misconduct by law enforcement officers" to the extent that "where the unreasonable search...was 
such as to shock the conscience of the court, the court would not permit such conduct to be the basis 
of state-imposed sanction" in a revocation proceeding. People v. Wilkerson. 541 P.2d 896 (Colo. 
1975). 
In the instant matter, Teschini clearly testified he was not conducting the search under 
suspicion of illegality or probationary status, and any safety issues were dispelled by the first search 
and the release of Rentz from their detention. An exception to the Scott and Jarman rules is 
necessary as it pertains to factual scenarios as found in the instant matter in order to protect the 
Fourth Amendment rights of everyday citizens from being stopped and searched upon no suspicion 
of illegality, probationary status or safety risk to others. Officers should not be allowed to undertake 
the actions that violated Rente's Fourth Amendment rights in this matter and such conduct should 
not be tolerated as the basis for any type of state-imposed sanction. 
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ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S MOHON TO SUPPRESS 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERTAINED AND GRANTED 
A. The Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Probation Revocation Proceedings 
and its Exceptions. 
The United States Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule is a creature of judicial decisional policy. Broadly stated, its purpose is to deter illegal police 
conduct by denying the state the benefit of improperly obtained evidence." Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 
L.Ed.2d 1782 (1949); Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). 
State v. Dodd 419 So.2d 333 Fla.,1982. The determination as to whether the Fourth Amendment 
should apply to probation and parole revocation proceedings has been analyzed by nearly every 
jurisdiction in the United States, but none of these jurisdictions has specifically touched on the issues 
contained herein. Rentz does not attempt to overturn the standing precedence, as set forth below, 
as to the Fourth Amendment's application to probation revocation proceedings, but will show that 
further analysis should be undertaken at the trial court to safeguard the rights of the probationer. 
Further, Rentz argues that a blanket determination should not be the eventual course in each and 
every case, but that a totality of the circumstances analysis should be the determining factor as to the 
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to each particular probation case. 
(1) In Scott, the United States Supreme Court Has Declined to Apply the Exclusionary 
Rule or Fourth Amendment Rights to Parole Revocation Hearings. 
(a) The Majority in Scott Held the Exclusionary Rule to Be Prudential 
Rather than Constitutionally Mandated and Thus Not Applicable to 
Parole Revocation Proceedings. 
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In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524U.S.357,118 S. Ct. 2014,141 
L.Ed.2d 344, (U.S. Pa. 1998), a bare majority decision, the United States Supreme Court undertook 
an analysis of the application of the exclusionary rule and the Fourth Amendment to parole 
revocation hearings. In Scott the court stated that a Fourth Amendment ". . .violation is 'fully 
accomplished' by the illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or 
administrative proceeding can 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already 
suffered.'" Id. citing United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-3412, 82 
L.Ed.2d 677 (quoting Stone v. Powell. 428 U.S. 465,486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048-3049, 49 L.Ed.2d 
1067). Rather than being curative, the exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of 
deterring illegal searches and seizures. Id. citing United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338,348, 94 
S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). As such, the rule does not "proscribe the introduction of 
illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons," Id. c/rmgPoweli 428 U.S. at 486, 
96 S.Ct. at 3048-3049, but applies only in contexts "where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served." Id. citing Calandra. 414 U.S. at 348,94 S.Ct at 620; see also, United States 
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,454,96 S.Ct 3021, 3032,49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) ("If... the exclusionary 
rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is 
unwarranted"). 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Scott was only decided by a bare majority, with a 5-4 
margin. Id. 524 U.S.357, 118 S. Ct. 2014. In Scott, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation proceedings and that the federal exclusionary 
rule does not bar evidence from being admitted that was obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court indicated that a state's use of the illegally obtained evidence 
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does not violate the Constitution since & parole1 revocation hearing is administrative rather than 
criminal in nature. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to allow the exclusionary rule 
to apply to parole revocation hearings, maintaining that allowing the exclusionary rule to apply 
would cause an administrative proceeding to involve "extensive litigation" to determine what 
evidence would be admissible. Id The United States Supreme Court majority in Scott held that, 
because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, it is applicable only where its 
deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs." Scott at 363, citing Leon. 468 U.S. at 
906,104 S.Ct. at 3411-3412. 
(b) The Minority in Scott Dissented on the Basis That the Exclusionary Rule Is 
Constitutionally Mandated and Should Apply to Parole Revocation 
Proceedings as a Deterrence. 
The four United States Supreme Court justices who comprised the minority in Scott chose 
to write an extensive dissenting opinion on the matter. Justice Souter, the writer of the dissenters' 
opinion in Scott, stated that the majority's opinion".. .rests upon mistaken conceptions of the actual 
function of revocation." Scott at 524 U.S. at 370, 118 S. Ct. at 2023, Justice Souter, with whom 
Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsberg and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. Justice Souter explained as 
follows: 
In reality a revocation proceeding often serves the same function as a criminal trial, 
and the revocation hearing may very well present the only forum in which the State 
will seek to use evidence of a parole violation, even when that evidence would 
support an independent criminal charge. The deterrent function of the exclusionary 
1
 Research indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court has never specifically made this 
determination as to probation revocation proceedings; however, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
determined that probation and parole revocation proceedings are the same and that Scott thus 
applies to probation revocation, as well as parole revocation proceedings. See, State v. Jarman. 
1999 UT App 269, 987 P.2d 1284, below. 
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rule is therefore implicated as much by a revocation proceeding as by a conventional 
trial, and the exclusionary rule should be applied accordingly. 
Id "[T]he actual likelihood of trial is often far less than the probability of a petition for parole 
revocation, with the consequence that the revocation hearing will be the only forum in which the 
evidence will ever be offered." Id, 524 U.S. at 374,118 S. Ct. at 2025. He further explained as 
follows: 
I think [the majority] has misunderstood the significance of admitting illegally seized 
evidence at the revocation hearing. On the one hand, the majority magnifies the cost 
of an exclusionary rule for parole cases by overemphasizing the differences between 
a revocation hearing and a trial, and on the other hand it has minimized the benefits 
by failing to recognize the significant likelihood that the revocation hearing will be 
the principal, not the secondary, forum, in which evidence of a parolee's criminal 
conduct will be offered. 
What is at least equally telling is that parole revocation will frequently be pursued 
instead of prosecution as the course of choice, a fact recognized a quarter of a century 
ago when we observed in Morrissey v. Brewer that a parole revocation proceeding 
"is often preferred to a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of 
recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State." 408 U.S., 
at 479, 92 S.Ct, at 2599; see also Cohen & Gobert, § 8.06, at 386 ("Favoring the 
[exclusionary] rule's applicability is the fact that the revocation proceeding, often 
based on the items discovered in the search, is used in lieu of a criminal trial"). 
The reasons for this tendency to skip any new prosecution are obvious. If the conduct 
in question is a crime in its own right, the odds of revocation are very high. Since 
time on the street before revocation is not subtracted from the balance of the sentence 
to be served on revocation, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S., at 480,92 S.Ct., at 2599-
2600, the balance may well be long enough to render recommitment the practical 
equivalent of a new sentence for a separate crime. And all of this may be 
accomplished without shouldering the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 
hence the obvious popularity of revocation in place of new prosecution. 
The upshot is that without a suppression remedy in revocation proceedings, there will 
often be no influence capable of deterring Fourth Amendment violations when parole 
revocation is a possible response to new crime. Suppression in the revocation 
proceeding cannot be looked upon, then, as furnishing merely incremental or 
marginal deterrence over and above the effect of exclusion in criminal prosecution. 
Instead, it will commonly provide the only deterrence to unconstitutional conduct 
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when the incarceration of parolees is sought, and the reasons that support the 
suppression remedy in prosecution therefore support it in parole revocation. 
Id, 524 U.S. at 377,379,118 S. Ct. at 2026-2027. Justice Stevens aptly summarized the dissenters' 
opinion by offering one additional comment as a mere endorsement: 
.. .the "rule is constitutionally required, not as a "right9 explicitly incorporated in the 
fourth amendment's prohibitions, but as a remedy necessary to ensure that those 
prohibitions are observed in fact." Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: 
The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-
Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L.Rev. 1365,1389 (1983). See also Arizona v. Evans, 514 
U.S. 1,18-19, and n. 1,115S.Ct 1185,1195-1196, and n. 1,131 L.Ed.2d34(1995) 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 828, and n. 22, 
104 S.Ct 3380,3398, and n. 22,82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,978, and n. 37,104 S.Ct. 3430,3455, and n. 37, 
82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
Id, 524 U.S. at 369-370,118 S.Ct at 2023. Based on their determination that the exclusionary rule 
was constitutionally mandated and should apply to parole revocation hearings, the dissenters' 
opinion was that the search in Scott violated the Fourth Amendment. Scott at 524 U.S. at 380,118 
S.Ct. at 2028. 
(2) The Utah Court of Appeals Has Extended Scott to Probation Revocation 
Proceedings in Utah. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has applied the holdings in Scott to probation revocation 
proceedings in Utah. State v. Jarman. 1999 UT App 269, 987 P.2d 1284. Like the Pennsylvania 
parole proceeding at issue in Scott the Utah appellate courts have previously determined that 
probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature. Jarman at f 7, citing State v. Hudecek, 965 
P.2d 1069,1071 (UtahCt.App.1998). The Utah Court of Appeals bridged the difference in the parole 
proceedings of Scott versus the probation proceedings in Jarman by stating that "...courts generally 
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recognize the similarity between probation and parole proceedings and have treated them uniformly. * 
Id at If 72. 
In Jarman, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that".. .consistent with Scott, the Utah 
Supreme Court recently held that the exclusionary rule does not apply where the social costs 
outweigh the benefit of deterrence." Jarman at f7, citing In re A.R.. 982 P.2d 73, (holding that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to child protection proceedings). Jarman additionally recognized 
that ". . .the [United States Supreme] Court concluded that the marginal deterrence gained from 
applying the exclusionary rule in the narrow area of parole revocations did not justify the particularly 
high costs of excluding reliable, probative evidence. Id. at % 6. The decision in Jarman held that 
"...because the acts constituting a probation violation could also give rise to a criminal prosecution, 
the exclusionary rule*s application to criminal prosecutions already deters unreasonable searches and 
seizures of probationers." Id citing Scott. 118 S.Ct. at 2022. 
Consequently, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded in Jarman that they were bound by Scott, 
holding that the exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment does not apply in the context of 
probation revocation proceedings. Jarman at |7 . However, neither Jarman nor Scott discussed any 
exceptions to the application of the exclusionary rule to probation or parole revocation proceedings. 
2
 Jarman at f 7; see, e.g, Gaenon v. Scarpelli. 411 U.S. 778, 782 & n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 
1759-60 & n. 3,36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973)( "Petitioner does not contend that there is any difference 
relevant to the guarantee of due process between the revocation of parole and the revocation of 
probation, nor do we perceive one."); State v. Bvingtoa 936 P.2d 1112,1116 n. 2,1117 (Utah 
Ct.App.l997)(noting that parole and probation proceedings are distinct but "discusspng] 
precedent relevant to both, interchangeably" and applying due process analysis from parole 
proceedings to probation revocation proceedings); State v. Martinez. 811 P.2d 205,209-10 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) (applying requirement from the parole context—that a dwelling search must be 
predicated on a reasonable suspicion—to the search of a probationer). 
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B. Rentz Would Have Prevailed on His Suppression Motion, Had it Been 
Entertained by the Trial Court 
(1) The Initial Stop of Rentz's Vehicle was Not Justified at its Inception. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that police searches are reviewed 
under a two-prong test: first, the officer's action must be justified at its inception, and second, the 
search must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial interference. 
Terry v.Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,19-20, 88 S.Ct 1868,20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Under the first prong, the 
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, lead the officer to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon 
will be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Tetmver. 947 P.2d 1157,1159 (Utah App. 1997) citing 
State v.Pena. 869 P.2d 932,940 (Utah 1994). The Utah Court of Appeals in Tetmver analyzed the 
first prong as follows: 
This court determines whether sufficient specific and articulable facts exist to 
establish reasonable suspicion by examining the totality of the facts and 
circumstances of the case. See Case, 884 P.2d at 1276; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at21, 
88 S.Ct. at 1880 ("And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must 
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion/'); State v. Potter* 863 
P.2d 40, 43 (Utah.Ct.App.1993) ("There is no bright line test for determining if 
reasonable suspicion exists. Rather, courts must look at the totality of the 
circumstances." (citation omitted)). "[W]hether a specific set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for 
correctness ... [with] a measure of discretion [afforded] to the trial judge when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts." Pena. 869 P.2d at 939. Id 
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Id at 1159. The Utah Court of Appeals more recently undertook an analysis of the issue surrounding 
the stopping of an automobile by an officer under the Fourth Amendment, as follows: 
"Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a 'seizure' within 
the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendmentf], even though the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention quite brief."State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125,f28, 
63 P.3d 650 (alterations in original) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648,653 
(1979)); see also United States v. Tibbetts. 396 F.3d 1132,1136 (10th Cir. 2005) ("A 
traffic stop is a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 'even though 
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief."' (citation 
omitted)). Therefore, such an action is justified only "if there is a reasonable 
suspicion that the [occupant of the vehicle] is involved in criminal activity," and "the 
State bears the initial burden for establishing the articulable factual basis for the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigatory stop." State v. Case, 884 
P.2d 1274,1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In general, "[t]he specific and articulable facts required to support reasonable 
suspicion are . . . based on an investigating officer's own observations and 
inferences." Id at 1276-77. "Reasonable suspicion is 'a particularized and objective 
basis' for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity," Tibbetts* 396 F.3d at 
1138, and whether or not a detention is supported by reasonable suspicion is 
determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, not through an 
examination of each individual fact. See State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95,f 38,103 P.3d 
699 (concluding that the totality of the circumstances did not support a police 
officer's warrantless search of the interior of an automobile for weapons). 
State v. Vfl^ift. 2005 UT App 261, flf 6-7,116 P.3d 969. The Utah Court of Appeals determined 
in Yazzie that "...the State has presented us with no circumstances that existed at the time of [the 
officer's] decision to stop Yazzie that suggest Yazzie was involved in any illegal activity, let alone 
circumstances sufficient to justify the detention." Id. at f 10. The officer's intention in Yazzie was 
not justified at its inception. Id. at % 12. 
In the instant matter, Officer Teschini testified that he searched Rentz's car at Phillips' 
residence, and released Rentz. Teschini then testified that he received further information from 
Phillips, however, this information did not cause him to believe that Rentz was engaged in any 
15 
illegal activity. Tr. at pp. 17,27,28. Teschini also testified, however, that Phillips had informed 
him that Rentz was on probation and was not supposed to be in possession of a gun. Id. at p. 17. 
Rather than checking Rentz's probation status3 to determine whether Phillips' hearsay information 
was correct, Teschini chose to effectuate a stop and subsequent search of Rentz's vehicle. 
Officer Teschini's decision to stop Rentz failed to rise to either a reasonable or articulable 
suspicion, and there were no circumstances existing at the time of the stop to suggest that Rentz was 
involved in any criminal activity. See, Yazzie at % 10. "[SJpecific and articulable facts required to 
support reasonable suspicion are . . . based on an investigating officer's own observations and 
inferences/' Yazzie at f 7, citing Case at 1276-1277. Teschini testified that his "own observations 
and inferences" were such that he did not believe Rentz was involved in any criminal activity even 
if he found a gun in Rentz's vehicle. Teschini still chose to effectuate a stop and search of Rentz's 
vehicle, however, in violation of Rentz's Fourth Amendment rights. 
(2) The Second Search of Rentz's Vehicle was Unreasonable. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently undertaken an analysis of Terry specifically as it 
pertains to searches conducted for purposes of finding and neutralizing suspected weapons. See, 
State v. Naiarno. 2005 UT App 311,118 P.3d 285. Naiarno recognized as follows: 
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious 
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the 
officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the 
power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying 
3
 No testimony was offered, and it is unclear whether Teschini himself knew as to 
whether the information he received on Rentz's probation status from Phillips—who received the 
information from Rentz's ex-girlfriend over the phone-was current or completed. 
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a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. [Terry] at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868 
(emphasis added). 
However, the Court cautioned that the "necessary measures" authorized in Terry 
"constitute[ ] a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security," and 
that as such they must "be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify 
[their] initiation." Id, at 24-26,88 S.Ct. 1868. Moreover, the Court further stated that 
the only reason such a search is permitted is to find and neutralize suspected 
weapons, and that the search undertaken to complete this narrow task "must therefore 
be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, 
clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." Id. at 29,88 
S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added). Consequently, although Terry does not define the 
physical scope of a permissible search in the absence of probable cause, it clearly 
identifies when such a search may be made, as well as clearly stating that the search 
must be narrowly tailored to do no more than blunt the exigency that permitted the 
search in the first place. 
In precise terms, Terry states that a police officer is permitted to "search" a person 
that the officer reasonably believes (1) is involved in a crime; (2) is armed; and (3) 
is presently dangerous to the officer, the public, or the person to be searched. See id, 
at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Moreover, "[a] search for weapons in the absence of probable 
cause to arrest ... must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the 
exigencies which justify its initiation," and cannot stray into a general search for 
evidence of wrongdoing." Id, at 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added). 
In Terry,... the Supreme Court concluded that the search was reasonable, holding 
that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in 
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and 
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter 
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'safety, he is entitled for the 
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of 
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be 
used to assault him. Id, at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added). 
Id, at ff 13-16. Najamo challenged the search of his person for weapons as a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights indicating that the search went beyond the bounds of reasonability required by 
Terrv. Id, at 112. The Utah Court of Appeals reviewed the search and seizure issues for correctness, 
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basing their review on their examination of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at f 10. The Utah 
Court of Appeals determined in Najarno that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and 
that, "...concluding otherwise would, in the words of Justice Douglas, result in a situation where 'the 
police have greater authority to make a seizure and conduct a search than a judge has to authorize 
suchaction."'i#atf 12,ci/wgTenxat36,88S.Ct 1868 (Douglas, J., dissenting4). The Utah Court 
of Appeals recognized that its proper role, as articulated in Terry, was "...to zealously 'guard against 
police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without 
the objective evidentiaryjustification which the Constitutionrequires,"'concluding that there existed 
no articulated facts suggesting that the officer in Naiamo was faced with an exigency that required 
his raising of Najarno's pant leg to extend his search beneath the outer clothing. Id. at fflf 21-22, 
citing Terry at 15, 88 S.Ct. 1868. 
The United States Supreme Court has previously undertaken a similar analysis as it pertains 
to the application of Terry to a search of a passenger compartment of an automobile. See, Michigan 
v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032,103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). It concluded as follows: 
...the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas 
in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer 
possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the 
officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain 
immediate control of weapons. 
4
 Although the dissent to Naiamo painstakingly argues against the majority's use of this 
quote given its dissenting nature, it fails to recognize that "...like many opinions voiced in 
dissent, Justice Douglas raised certain valid and important points that, when viewed in the proper 
light, focus our attention on our role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The above cited 
language is just one of those points, and the fact that it was articulated in dissent is of no 
importance." Najarno at f 12, fii. 5. 
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Id. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481; see, Terry at 21, 88 S.Ct at 1880. "[T]he issue is whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that 
of others was in danger." Id, citing Terry at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. 
In the instant matter, Officer Teschini testified that, after Rentz had left Phillips' residence, 
he was not effectuating the stop and second search of Rentz's vehicle based on any suspicion of 
illegal activity or because he believed Rentz was on probation. Teschini specifically testified at the 
probation revocation hearing in this matter that, at the time he stopped and searched Rentz, he did 
not believe Rentz was committing any illegal act by possessing a gun. Tr. at p. 28. Officer Teschini 
additionally testified at the hearing that he was not executing a probation search of Rentz. Tr. at pp. 
17. The only reason Teschini would have for conducting the first or second search of Rentz's 
vehicle then, would be for safety purposes, as regulated by Terry. 
The facts of this case clearly indicate that Teschini responded to a report by Phillips that 
Rentz was harassing her and that he was the owner of a gun, but that he had not used or shown that 
he was in possession of any gun or weapon during the alleged harassment. Tr. at pp. 10, 20. 
Teschini testified that, when he arrived on scene, Rentz was inside a house approximately one 
hundred yards from Phillips residence, and would not come out. Id at pp. 10, 12. Teschini 
borrowed a knife from Phillips to pry the door open where Rentz was located. Id at p. 26. Upon 
opening the door, they found Rentz to be sober, cooperative, and unarmed. Id at p. 10. 
Upon receiving information from Phillips that Rentz had a gun in his vehicle, the police 
sergeant who arrived on scene asked Rentz if they could search his vehicle, to which Rentz 
consented. Tr. at p. 11. The consensual search did not yield any results, so the sergeant told Rentz 
to leave the area. Id Teschini testified that Rentz left, "...taking his time." Id. at p. 12. Teschini 
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then went to return the knife to Phillips, at which time Phillips stated to him that Rente's girlfriend 
had told her that Rentz's cup holder could be removed and that it was concealing a gun. Id. 
Teschini got in his patrol car, activated his light bar, followed in the direction Rentz had gone, and 
effectuated a stop of Rentz's vehicle. Tr. at p. 12. Teschini told Rentz to stand in front of his 
vehicle while he searched the cup holder. Id. Teschini located the gun at issue herein underneath 
the cup holder. 
It is clear that the police sergeant and Teschini had requested consent to search Rentz's 
vehicle the first time for safety purposes. Although Rentz was sober, cooperated with police, 
exhibited no heightened threat to anyone, and had not been involved in any illegal activity, the 
officers had received a report that Rentz was harassing someone and that he was the owner of a gun. 
It can be assumed with this information that the police sergeant and Teschini wanted to ensure that 
allowing Rentz into his vehicle to leave would not pose a danger to anyone involved, so they asked 
to search his vehicle. Upon dispelling their concerns respecting the safety of those around them, they 
allowed Rentz to enter his vehicle and watched him leave the area. 
Once Rentz left the premises, one of the factors of Terry was no longer present. Officer 
Teschini was no longer investigating Rentz at a "close range" that would cause him to fear for his 
safety or the safety of others. Naiarno at t 13, citing Terry at 24, 88 S.Ct 1868. No further 
illegality or threat exhibited itself between the time Rentz left the property and was stopped by 
Teschini. Any safety issues the officers may have had were dispelled upon Rentz leaving the 
property. As stated supra, there was no suspicion of illegality and the officer was unaware Rentz 
was on probation, so the only purpose Teschini had to effectuate the second search would have been 
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the original purpose of the first search-that of safety-which was dispelled upon Rentz leaving the 
premises. 
Terry is very clear on this matter that, "[a] search for weapons in the absence of probable 
cause to arrest... must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies whichjustify 
its initiation, and cannot stray into a general search for evidence of wrongdoing." Teny 25-26, 88 
S.Ct. 1868. It is clear that any safety issues that may have existed were dispelled prior to the second 
search undertaken after the illegal stop of Rentz's vehicle by Teschini. No "exigencies" existed to 
effectuate the stop and second search. Rente's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and this 
Court should "...zealously 'guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which 
trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution 
requires."' Naiarno at fl[ 21-22, citing Terry at 15, 88 S.Ct. 1868. 
C. An Exception to the Jarman Role Should Be Recognized in Cases Where an 
Officer has No Justification for a Stop or Search. 
The Second District Court of Appeals has long held that "[p]arolees are, of course, not 
without constitutional rights...and there is always the possibility of police harassment...[which 
instances] can be treated as they arise/' U. S. ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick. 426 F.2d 1161 (2nd 
Circuit, N.Y. 1970); see, Hvser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 243 (C.A.D.C. 1963); United States v. 
Hallman. 365 F.2d 289,291 (3d Or. 1966); Brown v. Kearney. 355 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1966) (per 
curiam); Martin v. United States. 183 F.2d 436,439 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 340 U.S. 904,71 S.Ct. 
280, 95 L.Ed. 654 (1950); Abel v. United States. 362 U.S. 217, 240, 80 S.Ct. 683,4 L.Ed.2d 668 
(1960). The Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have recognized that, if a case involves police 
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harassment, an exclusion rule should be invoked to prevent recurrence. See, U.S. v. Farmer. 512 
F.2d 160,162 (6th Cir. (Ky.) 1975); U.S. v. Brown. 488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. (Fla.) 1973). 
Our sister state, Colorado has similarly conceded that probationers are entitled to certain 
procedural due process rights at revocation hearings, People v. Atencio. 525 P.2d 461 (Colo 1974), 
and its courts have cautioned that they would not condone "gross official misconduct by law 
enforcement officers" to the extent that "where the unreasonable search...was such as to shock the 
conscience of the court, the court would not permit such conduct to be the basis of state-imposed 
sanction" in a revocation proceeding. People v. Wilkerson. 541 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1975). The 
Virginia courts have held that evidence obtained through unlawful search is admissible in probation 
revocation proceedings in the absence of bad faith by police. Anderson v. Com.. 470 S.E.2d 862 
(Va. 1996). The Washington Court of Appeals has similarly determined that "only when the police 
act in bad faith should evidence which is illegally seized be suppressed in a probation revocation 
proceeding." State v. Procton 559 P.2d 1363,1364 (Wash. App. 1977). 
Florida has stated that "...for evidence derived from a search or seizure to be admissible in 
either probation revocation proceedings or a new criminal action, the evidence must be properly or 
reasonably obtained given the circumstances and the responsibilities of the probation supervisor or 
a law enforcement official who makes the search and seizure." Grubbs v. State, 373 So.2d 905 (Fla. 
1979). In the case of State v. Proctor, our sister jurisdiction held as follows with respect to applying 
the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings: 
A probation revocation petition could ... be dismissed ... if under the totality of the 
circumstances the trial court found that the police acted in bad faith in obtaining the evidence that 
formed the basis for the petition to revoke probation. Whether the police knew or had reason to know 
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that the person to be searched was on probation is an important factor to be considered in 
determining if there was sufficient governmental misconduct to dismiss. However, a determination 
whether there was sufficient governmental misconduct is a matter that rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge to be determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
search in each case. Id, 559 P.2d 1363,1364-1365 (Wash. App. 1977). 
The presiding judge, Richard Allen Griffin of the Michigan Court of Appeals undertook an 
analysis of this issue and, in a concurring opinion, also stated that he believed that the determination 
as to whether the exclusionary rule should apply to probation revocation hearings should hinge on 
a totality of the circumstances analysis. People v. Perry. 201 Mich.App. 347,353,505 N. W.2d 909, 
912 (Mich.App., 1993)(Griffin, Richard Allen concurring). Judge Griffin proposed an analysis that 
"...would apply the exclusionary rule to the probation revocation proceedings only in those cases 
where (1) the exclusion of the evidence would substantially further the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, and (2) the need for deterrence outweighs the harm to the probation system." Id. 
On review, Judge Griffin urged the Michigan Supreme Court to adopt the scholarly review and 
analysis contained in note, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to Probation Revocation 
Proceedings, 17 Mem.StU.L.R. 555 (1987), which sets forth as follows: 
[T]he decision whether to apply the exclusionary rule to a probation revocation 
proceeding] should only be made after carefully reviewing all the facts surrounding 
the particular fourth amendment violation to determine whether exclusion will 
substantially further the rule's deterrent purpose. Since the rule is not constitutionally 
mandated, the courts must carefully avoid defeating its deterrent purpose by 
mechanically applying the rule to every revocation proceeding. 
... [T]he court's analysis must focus specifically on any deterrent benefits application 
of the rule might provide. Various factors the courts should consider include whether 
the officer knew that the victim of the fourth amendment violation was a probationer, 
whether the officer was acting in good faith when conducting the illegal search, and 
whether the evidence was secured for the primary purpose of using it in a revocation 
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proceeding. Only after reviewing all the surrounding factors will the court be able to 
properly assess whether exclusion of the evidence will further the rule's deterrent 
purpose. 
Id. 201 MichApp. at 358,505 N.W.2d at 914-915. Judge Griffin then suggests that one more factor 
be added to this analysis, as articulated in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,94 S.Ct. 613,38 
L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), that the courts remain concerned with the harm that will necessarily result 
through exclusion of the incriminating evidence. Id. 201 MichApp. at 359, 505 N.W.2d at 915. 
Judge Griffin summarized his position into a two-step analysis, stating as follows: 
Therefore, the determination of whether to apply the exclusionary rule to a probation 
revocation proceeding requires a two-step analysis. First, the courts must ascertain 
whether any appreciable deterrent benefits can be achieved through exclusion. If so, 
the courts must then decide if the need for deterrence outweighs the injury the 
probation system will necessarily suffer if incriminating evidence is excluded from 
the proceeding. Only if the answer to the latter question is yes should the 
exclusionary rule be applied. 
Id 
The purpose behind the determination by the United States Supreme Court in Scott and the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Jarman to not allow the exclusionary rule to apply to probation and parole 
revocation proceedings hinges on the idea that the rule is for deterrence of police illegality rather 
than a constitutional right of an individual. However, in a case such as the instant one where the 
officer involved had absolutely no justification for stopping or searching the individual involved, the 
individual' s basic constitutional rights deserve protecting under an exception to the Scott and Jarman 
rules. 
The issue of the exclusionary rule's application has been analyzed in great depth, but none 
of the analyses have pertained to a case such as the instant one where the officer involved had no 
cause whatsoever to stop and search an individual's vehicle. The officer clearly testified he was not 
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conducting the search under suspicion of illegality or probationary status, and any safety issues were 
dispelled by the first search and the release of Rentz from their detention. Officer Teschini acted in 
bad faith in stopping and searching Rentz vehicle once he had been allowed to leave the premises. 
Teschini stopped someone who, according to his knowledge, had the same status as the average 
citizen driving down the street in their vehicle. 
An exclusionary rule should be invoked to deter recurrence of the bad faith exhibited by the 
officers in this matter. See, U.S. v. Farmer. 512 F.2d 160,162 (6th Cir. (Ky.) 1975); U.S. v. Brown. 
488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. (Fla.) 1973). This gross misconduct by the officers should not be permitted to 
be the basis of a state-imposed sanction in Rentz's probation revocation hearing. See, People v. 
Wilkerson. 541 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1975). Allowing an exception where the officer's bad faith conduct 
was the only purpose behind the stop and search of Rentz's vehicle would substantially further the 
rule's deterrent purposes by disallowing officers to benefit from acting in bad faith when they are 
not conducting a search based upon either suspicion of illegality, probationary status or safety of 
those involved. The need for deterrence in matters such as the instant one outweighs the injury the 
probation system would suffer since this narrowly defined exception would specifically require a 
showing that the officer was not undertaking a search based on suspicion of illegality, probation 
status or safety for those involved. 
An exception is necessary as it pertains to factual scenarios as found in the instant matter in 
order to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of everyday citizens from being stopped and searched 
upon no suspicion of illegality, probationary status or safety risk to others. Officers should not be 
allowed to undertake the actions that violated Rentz's Fourth Amendment rights in this matter and 
such conduct should not be tolerated as the basis for any type of state-imposed sanction. 
25 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court allow the evidence in the above-referenced matter to be suppressed. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 2005. 
William L.Schultz 
Attorney for Vernon Rentz 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 7th day of December, 2005,1 mailed, first class postage 
prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to: 
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court allow the evidence in the above-referenced matter to be suppressed. 
DATED this 7,b day of December, 2005, 
Uuu-, 1 <M 
William L. Schultz J 
Attorney for Vernon Rente 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 7W day of December, 2005,1 mailed, first class postage 
prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to: 
Mr, J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841J4-0S54 
Addendum ~A~ 
Probation Revocation and Commitment to Utah 
State Prison dated July 19, 2005 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
FILED JUL 1 9 2005 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VERNON RENTZ 
DOB: 10/21/1981, 
Defendant. 
PROBATION REVOCATION 
AND COMMITMENT TO 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 0317-5 
JULY 18,2005 
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Plaintiff Attorney: Craig C. Halls 
Defendant Attorney: William L. Schultz 
Defendant appearing on July 18, 2005, before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District 
Court Judge, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause why the defendant should not be held in 
violation of the probation agreement in this matter and the defendant having been found in 
violation of the terms of the probation agreement and no legal reason having been shown why 
defendant's probation should not be revoked and the judgment previously pronounced be upheld 
IT IS ORDERED that probation is hereby revoked and the previous judgment of this 
Court is imposed, to wit: 
That the defendant be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for a term of ONE (1) TO 
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS on Count 1: ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a Second 
Jul 19 OS 01:13* Craie Hal ls 43558731IS ( ••2 
Degree Felony, and NOT MORE THAN FCVK (5) YEARS on Count 2: AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, to be served concurrently. 
Defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the Sao Juan County Sheriff or other 
proper officer to be transported to the Utah State Prison. 
DATED Otis day of July. 2005, 
KiWisjAtt 
Court Judge 
San Juan < fy Attorney 
CERYEF1CATE OF MAIUNG^RIAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on txJD_ day of July, 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid, or 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF 
COMMrTMENT to William L. Schuttz, Attorney for the defendant; Adult Probation and Parole 
at 1165 S. Highway 191, S«>te3, Agoab,UTM532;andtoaKDcpartme^ PO 
Box 250, Dripcr, UT 84020. 
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